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FOREIGN POLICY ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS

                                         by Peter R. Baehr​[1]​

                                
1.	INTRODUCTION

“The Netherlands Government regards the promotion of human rights as an essential part of its foreign policy. This view is rooted in its awareness that the aims of this policy are not restricted to promoting the interests of the Kingdom of the Netherlands but also extend to values which go beyond such interests and for which the Kingdom shares responsibility as a member of the world community.”​[2]​ 

That was what the Netherlands Government had to say back in 1979. And it apparently still held this view in 2006. On 21 September of that year, Foreign Minister Ben Bot delivered a speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations, in which he said among others:  

“Anti-terrorism measures can only be effective if adopted within the context of the human rights commitments we have undertaken. Ultimately, our defence should not come at the expense of the very values upon which our societies are founded. Our citizens must be able to distinguish between the societies in which they lead productive lives, and the terrorist movements for whom human life has little value.”​[3]​ 

This paper deals with four types of foreign policy actors: governments, non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations, and other non-state actors with reference to human rights.
 
2 HUMAN RIGHTS IN FOREIGN POLICY

International human rights standards developed since the end of World War II, now serve as rules for governments on how to treat their own nationals as well as other residents. Moreover, it is now commonly accepted that the way in which human beings are treated, is a legitimate concern of all states. Therefore, human rights have also become part of the foreign policy of many countries. In today’s era of globalization the scope and intensity of activities that transcend national borders, have greatly increased. Diplomats exchange memoranda, attend meetings, take part in dialogues and introduce resolutions at meetings of international organizations in order to address the human rights concerns of their country or a group of countries. 

Human rights have a place of their own in foreign policy. More traditio​nal objects of foreign policy, such as the protection of national security or the promotion of foreign economic relations, are based on the material interests of the state concerned. Human rights do not refer to such material interests. Governments that want to promote human rights abroad, do not set themselves an easy task. They have to face difficult choices of policies and priorities. Raising human rights issues may lead to intensive discussions and even tensions with other countries. Such governments may also have to deal with domestic circles of opinion opposed to having a concern for human rights that may complicate the pursuit of security and economic interests.

One can ask why governments decide to include the promotion of human rights among their foreign policy objectives. Some authors argue that national identity plays a large role. For example, the United States has a tradition of seeing itself as a global champion for human rights and especially democracy. Thus it is difficult but not impossible for Washington to turn away completely from human rights in foreign policy. Others have argued that it is in the national interest of liberal democracies to export their norms and values, including human rights norms. Order and peace in the world would be stimulated by the dissemination of the notions of liberty and democracy all over the world. Attention for human rights in world politics would add to the dissemination of these notions. Another factor is pressure on the government exercised by domestic human rights groups to work for the improvement of human rights in the world.

Today, much lip service is paid to the notion of human rights. At the same time, human rights are being violated all over the world. Human rights are a matter of law, they are codified in many international documents, and interpreted by international lawyers,  United Nations treaty bodies and regional supervisory bodies. However, human rights have increasingly become a matter of diplomacy and politics as well. Although the issue of human rights has received a place of its own in international politics, the amount of attention paid to this issue differs from time to time and from government to government. 

Human rights are often viewed as an aspect of morality in politics, rather than a subject linked to national interest. In international relations theory different opinions exist with regard to the position of morality in international relations. From a realist point of view, based on the traditions of Thucydides and Machiavelli, the question of traditional or individual ethics in international relations seems to be of minor or no importance.​[4]​  Realists argue that the international society is an anarchical one in which order can only be reached by maintaining the balance of power. In order to strengthen national power, the national interest defined in terms of power and security should be the key concept in a country’s foreign policy. The state is seen as the central actor in international politics and to maintain international peace and security, sovereign states should refrain from intervening in each other’s affairs. Consequently, realists hardly pay attention to the promotion of human rights in international politics. Many realists, especially in democratic states, conflate morality with national power. What is morally good is what promotes and protects the power of the democratic state. 

International liberals, often citing US President Woodrow Wilson as a model and who stress the importance of morality in international relations, try to reach peace and stability by stimulating cooperation between states. The use of international law is one of the most important instruments in this respect. In this tradition, the well being of humanity is important, much more so than the sovereignty of the state. As a result, human rights policy is very much emphasized. International liberals argue that states are central actors in international relations, but also focus attention on the international society of states. Internationalists stress the importance of the evolving concept of human rights. From that point of view, action for the promotion of human rights is considered highly desirable.

Realists tend to see human rights in instrumental terms, useful to the state when compatible with national power. Liberals tend to see human rights in more absolutist terms, to be taken seriously even if this means limitations on state power. US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, a realist, became interested in human rights in southern Africa in the 1970s because of fear that the Soviet Union would use the repressive situation to expand its influence.​[5]​ President Jimmy Carter, initially a liberal, was interested in human rights improvement in southern Africa because it was the right thing to do,

The realist and the liberal approach are reflected in day-to-day foreign policy. At the one end of the continuum, we find governments that, in accordance with the realist tradition, pay hardly attention to human rights or use human rights only as an instrument to strengthen the security interests of their state. At the other end, there are governments that pay extensive attention to human rights, on the assumption it will strengthen international order and peace in the long run, and reflects the best part of their national tradition, honour and identity. 

It is definitely not to promote the interests of the so-called “international community”. Though often mentioned by politicians and journalists alike, such an international community” so far does not exist. It is usually mentioned to refer to some not defined, vague group of states – usually on the side of the person who makes mention of it. It may refer to the United Nations as a whole, the Security Council, NATO or some other regional group. This “international community” should not allow Israel to invade weak, defenceless Lebanon. Its name is used to refer to American and British efforts to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan. In 1999 it was supposedly this “international community” on whose behalf the Americans and British (as well as the Dutch!) intervened in Kosovo to defeat the Serbian regime of Slobodan Milosevic that persecuted the ethnic Albanians in that country. No mandate was asked of the Security Council out of fear of a Russian or Chinese veto. The term “international community“ is a vague concept mostly used to legitimate military activities of one’s own. Unless precisely defined, it should be banished from serious academic discussions.

The “European community” is another matter. The member states of the European Union have decided to aim for a Common Foreign and Security Policy, including human rights. The advantage is that, if the 27 member states can come to an agreement, their voice is of course much louder, and possibly more effective, than if one or two states express their views on a certain situation involving human rights. However, the result is often a weakening of the initial position, before a compromise position can be reached. Another drawback is that the member states of the European Union are reluctant to express themselves on the situation in one of the member states itself.​[6]​ 

3. DILEMMAS OF FOREIGN POLICY
                                                                                                      
3.1. Introduction
In foreign policy practice, situations may be faced in which different policy objectives may turn out not to be compatible. A choice must be made between alternatives, all of which have negative consequences. Having to make difficult choices and setting priorities is part of all policy-making, but even more so in the field of human rights than in other areas. This is caused by two kinds of factors. First of all, a human rights policy may conflict with the maintenance of friendly relations with foreign governments. This is especially the case, if the foreign government in question is responsible for gross human rights violations. That will call for a response by those governments that emphasize human rights in their foreign policy. Their embassies will be instructed to report on the human rights situation, if necessary on the basis of some specific fact-finding, which may involve asking questions that will be percei​ved as unfriend​ly by the offending government. The latter may see this as endangering mutual friendly relations. Obviously, these relations will be perceived as even further endange​red, if the questions are followed up by criti​cism, the more so if such criticism is publicly expressed.

A second factor is that human rights policy often implies that a govern​ment deals with matters that other governments consider part of their domestic affairs and their sovereignty. Governments prefer to keep their human rights violations secret, or, if such efforts are unsuccessful, claim that they are no business of outsiders. 

A policy of human rights means a choice among priorities. It means that a government will have to decide, whether and when it will give priority to human rights over other foreign policy considerati​ons. These considerations belong to areas such as national security, economic relations, and development cooperation. Such policy considerations may conflict with each other. If they do, a government will have to make a policy choice and set priorities. 


3.2. Peace and security

There exists a general feeling among policy makers that the essence of human rights policy is always potentially conflictive and may lead to a deterioration of relations among states, as no government likes to be criticized for alleged human rights violations. 

Human rights will not always figure on the top of the list of priori​ties, even of those governments that see human rights as a central element in their foreign policy. Less will be said about human rights, if the offending government happens to be a major power. Criticism of human rights of such countries as the United States, the Russian Federation, or China can lead to an undesirable increase of tension in the world. 

The problem is relatively easy to solve when human rights considerations and national security interests coincide. During the height of the Cold War, this was largely true of the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States decried violations of human rights in the Soviet Union, such as suppression of freedom of expression and freedom of religion. The USSR for its part criticized the United States for the civil rights situation in that country and for at the time not even having ratified the major UN human rights instruments. Both the United States and the USSR used the language of human rights to try to de-legitimize and undermine the other. Observers are usually well advised to be aware of the use of the human rights discourse for other purposes than a genuine concern for the human dignity of individuals.
 
When the Cold War had ended, western states had to look for an accommodation between a policy of détente, which had been adopted by both alliances, as symbolized by the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) of 1975, the ‘Helsinki agreements,’ on the one hand, and the rejection of basic human rights violations on the other. Although in its view, the two were not necessarily in conflict with each other, the government of the Soviet Union considered criticism of its human rights record as a threat to détente. The subsequent frequent international meetings in the framework of CSCE were characterized by on the one hand the desire to maintain and expand détente between east and west, while at the same time – at least among western states – trying to improve the human rights situation in Central and Eastern Europe. 

The failure by the United States to follow up on its own State Department’s annual human rights reports on the situation in Chechnya in the Russian Federation is a clear example of where security interests tend to prevail over human rights considerations. According to the State Department report, during 2005 the Russian government’s record in Chechnya was rather poor: “Both federal forces and their Chechen government allies generally acted with impunity. (…) [T]here continued to be credible reports that federal armed forces engaged in unlawful killings in Chechnya.” The State Department report on the Russian Federation was full of these and other violations of fundamental human rights. Yet, the United States government did little to follow-up on this report. Security considerations prevailed. The Russian Federation was simply too large a piece to swallow. Actions by the United States (or other western nations for that matter) of a military or non-military nature were rightly expected to have negative consequences for international peace and security. Therefore little action was undertaken.

It was also the case that the United States wanted Russia’s cooperation on a whole series of foreign policy questions such as regulating the use of nuclear energy in Iran and stopping government-supported attacks on civilians in the Darfur region of the Sudan. The fact that Russia is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, with the right of veto, meant that any tough measures by the United States and its allies about human rights in Russia could lead to Russian non-cooperation with any policy matter discussed in that Council.
 
Finally, since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the “war on terrorism” is, certainly in the United States, considered the most important aspect of national security. It has trumped most considerations of human rights. Human rights violations in states that cooperate with the United States in combating terrorism, are virtually disregarded, while the objectives of spreading democracy and human rights are mostly seen in function to national security. Terrorism is, in the view of many governments, what first and foremost must be combated – even at the risk of violating basic human rights.  Some states claim that combating terrorism contributes to the protection of innocent civilians. Yet, when this means the long-time suspension of some basic civil and political rights, it would seem that the chosen remedy is almost as bad – or even worse -- than the evil it tries to combat. 

3.3. Economic Relations

Human rights considerations may come into conflict with international economic relations. The question has often been raised, whether trade should continue undisturbed with countries whose governments are engaged in major human rights violations, or whether the suspension of such trade might help to put pressure on the offending government. This came out, for example in 1997, when West European governments at first agreed on submitting a draft resolution at the UN Commission on Human Rights criticizing China for its poor human rights record. However, when France and some other EU member states became involved in concluding a lucrative contract for selling aircraft to China, they decided to withdraw their initial support for the resolution. It was a clear case of economic considerations trumping human rights.  

Under United States President Ronald Reagan, increasing public attention was paid to the human rights situation in countries as diverse as Cuba and South Africa, as well as the Soviet Union, the “evil empire”. The Bush Sr. administration began to pay more attention to human rights violations in America’s long time ally in the Middle East, Israel, while the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe was partly acclaimed as a victory for United States human rights policy. All recent United States administrations have found it difficult to formulate a consistent policy vis-à-vis China. While on the one hand critical of China’s violation of a number of fundamental human rights, the United States has made an effort to maintain a smooth working relationship with that government. The Clinton administration was strongly criticized by human rights activists for renewing in 1994 China most-favoured nation status in trade relations with the United States. President George W. Bush seems to be so much in need of China’s support in his fight with the “axis of evil” (consisting of Iraq, Iran and North Korea) that his administration seems to have given up its efforts to criticize China for its human rights record. Basically, his policy was one of engagement: business as usual, with no sanctions over human rights violations, hoping for improvement of the human rights situation over time. 

For a small country such as the Netherlands, it is even more difficult for the government to have human rights considerations prevail over economic considerations in its relations with China. While trade with China and investment in the Chinese economy are of great importance to the Netherlands, it is obvious that its voice in the field of human rights can be easily disregarded by the Chinese government. Therefore, the Netherlands has preferred to express its views – diplomatically – mainly through he channels of the European Union, which, however, for similar reasons has been very careful in its pronouncements on the human rights situation in China.  

In the case of South Africa, in the past, important economic considerations competed with abhorrence of the apartheid policy, a legally established system of racial discrimination, which was an obvious gross violation of human rights. Certain western governments participated in a voluntary oil embargo, while Sweden introduced a law on investments whereby certain imports from South Africa, including coal, would be restricted. In 1983, most western states abstained when the UN General Assembly condemned the new (pro-apartheid) South African constitution. In 1984, the Security Council adopted a voluntary embargo on the import of arms from South Africa. This may have done some damage to the South African economy and have helped to put pressure on the South African government to end apartheid.  The same was true of the so-called “disinvestment” actions undertaken at a number of universities in the United States and the campaign not to buy South African “Outspan” oranges in Europe. These actions in and of themselves may not have done great damage to the South African economy, but they helped to mobilize public opinion in western states against apartheid and added to the moral pressure on the South African government. 

Next to the issue of peace and security mentioned before, the European Union has also been somewhat reluctant to strongly criticize the human rights record of the Russian Federation with regard to its suppression of the armed opposition in Chechnya. In this case, it is mainly the West European dependence on Russian natural gas deliveries which has prevented it from giving great emphasis to human rights violations within Russia.

With this type of actions one must always consider whether they (1) may damage the wrong people (i.e. adding to unemployment in the affected country) and (2) turn out to be counterproductive in that they hurt the economy of the action taking governments rather than the government guilty of human rights violations. It is hard to formulate general conclusions on this point rather than that the effectiveness of such actions very much depends on the issue and the country in question – hardly a very satisfactory conclusion. 

Case studies of bilateral economic relations serve to show how a government that makes support for human rights one of the main tenets of its foreign policy, may be confronted with difficult choices of policy. Whatever it does, it will always fall short in the eyes of some critics: either because of stressing human rights too much at the expense of other central elements of foreign policy, or because of paying not enough attention to human rights It can be concluded that human rights in general and the restoration of democracy in particular were the main reasons for initiating development assistance to these countries. 

3.4. Development Cooperation

Another dilemma presents itself when the government of an aid-receiving country is found engaged in the violation of human rights. Should donor countries continue their support, diminish or suspend it or terminate it altogether? An argument in favour of continuation is that development aid is meant to give support to the poor, who, in the case of discontinuation, would become victims twice: once through the violation of human rights by their own government and secondly by the suspension of aid by donor states. Moreover, as was shown in the example of economic relations, it is not at all certain that the offending government will be harmed by the suspension or termination of aid. On the other hand, continuation of aid could be seen as a (tacit) form of support to the offending regime, which would make the donor governments as it were accomplices in the violation of human rights. Diminishing or suspending aid can have at least a symbolic significance. The donor governments thereby distance themselves from the offending government. Below cases are discussed from the record of the Netherlands and the United States.

A difficult choice presented itself in the relations between the Netherlands and its former colony Indonesia, since the coming to power of President Suharto in 1965 until the ending of the aid relationship by Indonesia in 1992. On the one hand, the Netherlands government's policy was to extend aid to Indonesia to help its economic development. On the other hand, it was confronted with human rights violations for which the Indonesian government was responsible and which were at odds with the avowed human rights policy of the Netherlands. This led to an unpleasant policy choice: what type of consequences should its human rights policy have for the development relations with Indonesia, if any?​[7]​ A complicating factor were Dutch trade interests, that might be imperilled, if the Dutch government, in the view of Indonesia, put too much emphasis on the observation of human rights standards.  

In the Netherlands, relations with Indonesia have always been in the centre of attention. Political parties, non-governmental organizations, and the news media have always paid considerable attention to these relations. This was partly caused by the colonial past and the reluctance with which the Netherlands had parted with its colonial possessions in Asia in the late forties. At the same time, critics  pointed to the much sharper way in which the Netherlands  reacted to violations of human rights in another former colony, Suriname, with which development relations were fully suspended after the killings of a number of political opponents in 1982. 

The suppression by the Indonesian army of a coup d'état of left-wing officers on 30 September 1965 led to a period of massive violations of human rights. Between half a million and one million persons were killed. Arrests took place on a massive scale. These massive numbers of political prisoners were not, or only after a long time, put to any kind of trial. Many were detained in camps. Especially during the first years of detention, they were badly treated. Many were tortured, often leading to their deaths. The survivors were only gradually released, often after many years of detention. After their release, these 'ex-Tapols' remained exposed to all sorts of restrictions. The human rights situation further deteriorated in the early seventies, when death squads operated, killing opponents of the Suharto-regime. In 1975, Indonesia invaded and incorporated the former Portuguese colony of East-Timor. The Indonesian army also acted mercilessly against separatist movements in Aceh and West-Irian.

At the time, the question was raised in the Netherlands, whether and to what extent development aid should be used to put pressure on the Indonesian authorities, to get the political prisoners released. What should the Netherlands do under these circumstances? Economic and business relations with Indonesia had improved after 1966. Almost 10% of Dutch development aid went to Indonesia. Trade with Indonesia had tripled between 1966 and 1984. Cultural relations showed a growing improvement. On the other hand, non-governmental organizations continued to urge the Dutch government to do something about the deteriorating human rights situation in Indonesia. 

There were reports about human rights violations by the security forces in Irian Jaya, Aceh and East Timor. On the latter island, matters came to an explosion, when Indonesian military opened fire on a funeral procession in the East Timorese capital of Dili, killing an estimated one hundred persons. 

In reaction to some specific promises by Indonesia, the Netherlands government announced in January 1992 its willingness to resume its aid programme for Indonesia.part of which it had suspended. It stated that it assumed that the Indonesian-Portuguese negotiations about the future of East Timor were to lead to a satisfactory solution. But it added that, should these negotiations not lead to satisfactory results, it would discuss possible consequences with its European partners. In answer to the Dutch threat, Indonesia started a diplomatic offensive in order to prevent other donor countries from associating themselves with the Dutch approach. The Indonesian minister of foreign affairs visited a number of foreign capitals and succeeded in receiving the support he requested. The Indonesian government announced on 25 March 1992 that henceforth it did not want to receive Dutch aid anymore. 

The dilemma faced by the Netherlands was the result of its traditional emphasis on human rights in its foreign policy on the one hand, and its desire to maintain friendly relations with Indonesia -- including the maintenance of a policy of development cooperation to contribute to Indonesia’s economic development. The problems that arose were undoubtedly made more acute by the circumstance that it involved a relationship between a former colonial power and its former possession. 

The relationship between human rights and foreign aid has also often come up for debate in the United States.​[8]​ Congress has adopted various pieces of legislation with reference to human rights, in particular in relation to the U.S. foreign aid program. Of great importance is the law that requires the Department of State to submit an annual public report on the human rights situation at first in those countries that received U.S. foreign aid later in all countries of the world (with the single exception of the United States itself!), including information on the number of political prisoners, torture, arbitrary arrests and detention, arbitrary restriction of existing political rights, extralegal executions, and unfair trials. All American embassies must collect information about the human rights situation in their country of accreditation. The reporting covers only civil and political rights; with the exception of a few labour rights, economic, social and cultural rights are excluded. The latter are not considered to be human rights, but regarded as ambitions or aspirations. The quality of the reports has steadily improved over the years and includes critical assessments of the human rights situation in close allies of the US such as Israel.  It is of great importance that this type of reporting takes place, as it offers the opportunity to members of Congress and others to discuss the human rights situation in various countries on the basis of an official document supplied by the US government. Unfortunately, however, there is often little policy follow-up to the often highly accurate reports. The report over 2005 covered 196 countries. 

4. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are defined by what they are not. They emphasize their distance and independence from national governments, yet at the same time it is mostly the actions and activities of these governments that are the very cause and purpose of their existence. Without governments there would be no non-governmental organizations.​[9]​

Non-governmental human rights organizations (HRNGOs) exist in all sizes and shapes. They may run from a letter-head 'organization' basically existing of one individual with or without expert knowledge of the subject, to large organizations with thousands of members. The only thing these phenomena have in common is that they are, or claim to be, 'non-governmental.' The addition of 'claim to be' is needed, to cover the so-called 'GONGOs,' 'QUANGOs' and 'DONGOs'​[10]​ - that look like HRNGOs, but are not truly non-governmental. It is not always easy to distinguish in practice these government-supported organizations from the real thing. Apparently, governments find it useful to hide some of their activities under the guise of being 'non-governmental,' presumably because that title adds to their effectiveness. 

Providing reliable information to governments, intergovernmental organizations, politicians, the news media, academics as well as the general public is the most important precondition to be fulfilled for any NGO to have an impact. It is probably much more important than the views and comments that are being expressed, as these are often already known anyway. All concerned eagerly seek reliable information. It is in the area of the collection of sound, reliable information that the need for a professional expert staff is most clearly felt. NGOs that command such a staff can more easily provide such information than organizations that have to rely mostly on the activities of volunteers. Volunteers may also possess the necessary expertise, but often lack a collective memory of the past. A body of information is usually built on previous knowledge as well as personal acquaintances. Volunteers come and go and, though mostly highly motivated, they may lack experience. Therefore, the existence of a professional staff greatly adds to the information-gathering role of the NGO. 

Reliability is closely linked to credibility. A government that is the target of such information, will do its utmost to discredit its provider by questioning its motives (for example calling it 'political'), its financial resources ('CIA-supported', 'communist umbrella organization', and so on) and also its methods of work. In case such efforts are successful and the credibility of the organization's work has been successfully challenged, its impact may suffer for many years to come. 'New' kinds of violations of human rights seem to occur all the time. Before the seventies, most people thought that torture was a matter of the past. Human rights organizations have brought out that torture belongs very much to this day and age. The phenomenon of involuntary disappearances was another such phenomenon brought to light by NGOs. In the nineties, the world was confronted with 'ethnic cleansing,' something nobody had heard of before. 

For an NGO it is important to have access to the government. This means that it should be able to approach government officials to make them aware of its views. 'Access' may mean many things. It may mean that the organization can call an official on the telephone to make him or her aware of new information that may then be put to him or her in written form. It may mean having the ability to engage the official in a formal or informal conversation with representatives of the NGO, in order to raise the matter at the ministerial or cabinet level or at intergovernmental meetings. 

In certain countries, former NGO executives hold positions in national governments and NGO representatives are routinely included in official delegations to sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations and special conferences. This is a welcome feature, if seen from the perspective of gaining maximum access. However, maximum access may be gained at the expense of putting at risk the organization’s independence. It should be clear then that access to the government is of extremely great importance to NGOs. No impact without access, though access is no guarantee for success. NGOs should at the same time be aware of the dangers too easy access may entail. The government and its permanent officials may hedge them in. This means that the NGOs run the risk of being seen by the public as an extension of the government. For a government, it is of great importance to maintain close relations with NGOs it considers reliable. Seen from the government's perspective, there is little to be lost and much to be gained by such close relations. It is rather the NGOs that have to maintain a certain degree of caution in these relations. 

The issue of whom precisely NGOs represent, remains unsolved for the time being.​[11]​  In view of all of these difficulties, one may well come to the conclusion that the issues the NGOs take up are more important than their own democratic representativeness. But in the absence of more formal criteria for such representativeness, the claim of many of them of being grass roots movements should be taken with a considerable grain of salt.

The 'mobilization of shame' is greatly dependent on media exposure. Politicians in general and governments in particular are more likely to be persuaded to act on behalf of human rights, in the face of media attention or the threat of it. Even if HRNGOs make use of 'silent diplomacy' when approaching governments, for instance to bring about the release of a particular political prisoner or to end cases of torture, around the corner there is always the threat of media exposure. What remains in the last resort, is publicity in order to try to change a government's attitude and behaviour by public pressure. Chances of success are greater if the country concerned traditionally pays attention to expressions of public opinion, but there are no governments -- ranging from full-fledged democracies to dictatorships -- that can afford to ignore fully their public relations. In addition, public exposure may also lead to the exertion of external pressure by other governments or intergovernmental organizations.

Human rights NGOs play a role of some significance in international relations. That in itself remains a remarkable feat that calls for explanation. They criticize governments for violating human rights or for allowing or condoning such acts. Why should national governments pay attention to what HRNGOs have to say? The NGOs have no power; they rely on a relatively limited membership, if at all. They pose no economic or military threat. Yet, they are given the floor in meetings of intergovernmental organizations and in international conferences. Their representatives are received in national capitals and their views are paid at least lip service to. Governments even go as far as setting up or sponsoring fake NGOs to counter the activities of the real ones. Why?

The only answer to this question which is the same that is offered by the NGOs themselves, is the often-cited 'mobilization of shame.' This refers to the circumstance that all governments like to be known as civilized and as observing the international human rights standards that they themselves have helped to devise. No government will easily admit that it allows violations of those standards to take place. Yet, most governments in the world at some time or other violate them. This discrepancy between norm and practice creates the space in which HRNGOs can operate. Starting from the point of agreement as to how governments ought to behave, they draw attention to violations of these standards. Basically, governments have two ways of reacting to such allegations: admittance or denial. In view of their above-cited adherence to international human rights standards, admittance of violations of such standards logically means that something will be done about it. In such cases, one can say that the NGO's activities have been successful

If, as often happens, the government in question denies the allegation, the reputation of the NGO for reliability is at stake. In the absence of other elements of power, reliability is the only source of strength HRNGOs can dispose of or, I think, have at their disposal. By continuous truthful reporting an organization can build up a reputation of reliability, which must be zealously guarded. It can be threatened from two sides. First, of course by an offending government which may try either to discredit the HRNGO by questioning its motives or methods of work and by disseminating disinformation. But there is also a danger from the opposite direction. Political opponents of the government in question may try to use HRNGOs for purposes of their own by feeding the HRNGO with news about alleged atrocities on the part of the government that may actually never have taken place.​[12]​

Human rights NGOs remain crucial in calling attention to governments’ failure to carry out their international human rights obligations. While civil and political rights remain at the centre of attention, it is remarkable that in recent years more attention is also being paid to economic, social and cultural rights, especially in the countries of the Third World. This may be related to the greater voice expressed by indigenous human rights organizations in those countries. Much will depend on the question as to whether these organizations will be able to command the same quality and quantity of staff and other resources as the longer established “western” NGOs.  

5. MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 

Some multinational corporations dispose of more wealth and consequently more power than many national states. Their activities, e.g. in the field of developing natural resources, such as oil, natural gas and uranium, can have an enormous impact on the development of international politics. Sometimes, they are in a position in which they can force the fall of national governments and be strongly involved in the appointment of their successors. Increasingly, the notion is gaining acceptance that multinational corporations have also a role to play in the promotion of respect for human rights in the countries where they operate. This has taken many years of strenuous efforts on the part of especially non-governmental human rights organizations, which continue to remind multinationals of their responsibilities in this area. 

A Dutch legal scholar, Nicola Jägers, has looked into the question of which human rights may be at issue through the activities of multinational enterprises. She mentions the right to life, liberty and security, the prohibition of slavery, the freedom of movement and residence, the right to privacy, the right to freedom of expression, the right to assembly and association, the right to work, conditions of work and the right to form a trade union, the right to rest and leisure, the right to take part in government, the right to self-determination and to permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and resources.​[13]​ In the past, multinational corporations, when faced with criticism about their role in countries where gross human rights violations were taking place, used to refer to their observance of the law of the land and their refusal to ‘become involved in politics.’ In that attitude a change seems to have occurred. Some multinationals, such as for instance Royal Dutch Shell, tend to recognize their responsibility in this area and even use it in their public relations campaigns. 

In 1998, two human rights organizations, Amnesty International and Pax Christi International, published a study that was conducted in the context of a dialogue with nine Dutch multinational enterprises as well as employers and workers' organizations.​[14]​ The report outlines on the one hand human rights within a company's own operations and human rights within a company's direct environment on the other hand. The two human rights organizations proposed a number of ‘quality marks’ for a corporate code of conduct. They concluded their report by stressing that, in order to be effective, a corporate human rights policy must become an integral part of a company's culture. To this end:

	employees at all levels must be made aware of the company's standards;
	a monitoring system will be needed to regularly assess company performance;
	transparence requires the establishment of confidential complaint procedures for employees.

As important as the report itself -- or perhaps even more important -- is that through this initiative human rights organizations have entered into a dialogue with multinational corporations. The NGOs should, however, not lose sight of the fact that, notwithstanding all positive and praiseworthy initiatives, in the end the two parties have different objectives: respect for human rights on the one hand, and achieving maximum profits on the other hand. Human rights organizations are the only bodies that can permit themselves to be single-minded in the pursuit of the maximalization of respect of human rights.  

Economic globalisation is in the first place clearly ‘… being driven by forces other than the global human rights movement – mainly of course, by the interests of global capital, trans-national corporations, and their political allies’.​[15]​ This has, however, had great impact especially on the possibilities for people in Africa, Asia and Latin America to substantially realise their economic and social rights. The human rights organization Amnesty International has listed the following human rights that are violated through the operations of multinational corporations that benefit from the advantages of globalisation:

	employment of sub-contractors who abuse child labour, bonded labour or slave labour;
	hiring firms linked with human rights abuses;
	contracting producers who have prohibited or repressed unions or who violate accepted labour standards and endanger the health and safety of workers or other citizens;
	occupying indigenous peoples’ lands to extract national resources;
	failing to stop discrimination or observe rights to equal pay and many lesser infringements of standards.​[16]​ 

Yet, at the same time, some of the corporate leaders recognise that they must pay attention to human rights or risk consumer pressure. They have come to realize that they have also to fulfil a role in helping to guard the observance of human rights in countries where they are located. The use of child labour by clothing manufacturers, the damage to the physical environment by oil companies, the destruction of tropical forests by timber companies -- often doing great damage to the living conditions of the indigenous population -- are only a few of the many ways in which human rights can be affected by multinational corporations.  No longer do they only refer to ‘observing the laws of the land’ when being confronted with human rights violations of whatever kind. Non-governmental organizations have begun a dialogue with them, to consider in which way multinationals can fulfil their responsibilities. 

Human Rights Watch has with some reason, criticized many of the existing voluntary codes of conduct that are often written ‘in vague language (…) avoid some of the stickier human rights issues (…) such as how to do business in a country that bars labour unions, restricts the rights of women, guards company facilities with abusive soldiers, or uses joint-venture revenue to fund military abuses.’​[17]​

This leads to a twofold preliminary conclusion: either the multinational corporations should be made accountable to the rules of international law -- which may be difficult to accomplish --, or the role of the state should be strengthened, if prodded by human rights NGOs. States may be sooner prepared to undertake action in this field. 

6. OTHER NON-STATE ACTORS 

Other non-state actors include groups that aspire to statehood or to secession from existing states. They are commonly referred to as ‘non-governmental entities’ (NGEs) or ‘armed opposition groups’ that are willing to use armed force to overthrow existing governments or to secede from existing states. Some of them have over the years become almost as important in international relations as national states. The question arises whether and to what extent the observance of human rights is relevant for them.

In the past, the most important of such groups were the so-called ‘liberation movements’ that wanted to free their peoples and the territories in which they operated from colonial rule. They were often recognized as the legitimate representatives of the peoples still under colonial rule and many of them were granted special observer status in UN organs.  Examples of such groups are Frelimo in the former Portuguese Mozambique, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and the South-West African People’s Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia. Some of these organizations were guilty of human rights abuses during their fight for independence. 

Since the gaining of political independence by former colonies, the phenomenon of armed opposition groups has not disappeared. On the contrary, all over the world we find such groups that are referred to as ‘insurgents,’ ‘rebels,’ ‘terrorists,’ ‘subversive groups,’ ‘guerrillas,’ ‘criminals,’ ‘non-governmental groups’, ‘movements’, and ‘clans.’

Some of these groups, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) clearly aspire to statehood and have received a certain measure of international recognition. Other organizations have not (yet) reached that status. Some of them control de facto territories and populations; others are militarily and politically inferior to the established government, have no direct control over territory, and operate only sporadically. For example, in Northern Iraq (the Kurds), in Sri Lanka, and in Sudan, armed opposition groups operate as quasi-governments. 

On the whole, these groups have not signed or ratified international human rights treaties and can therefore not be called to account, if they violate the terms of such treaties. Human rights NGOs, such as Amnesty International, have long internally debated the question how they should approach such situations. Should such groups be asked to honour the same commitments in the field of human rights as the formal government of their country? Should they be asked to give their prisoners fair and prompt trials? How realistic would it be to treat such groups as if they were governments? And to what extent would the making of such demands imply some sort of informal recognition? The term ‘armed opposition groups’ is by no means a fixed concept in international law and for the time being ‘there exists little consensus on the question whether and under what conditions such armed opposition groups can or should be held accountable under international human rights law.’ ​[18]​

It is to be expected that in the near future the activities of such non-governmental entities will not decrease. There seems to be an upsurge of groups that have little in common except for an abundant supply of weapons and a striving for power. Together with that go killings of civilians, torture, and other violations of international human rights standards. The existence and contents of such standards are often little known to the perpetrators. That makes the supervision of their activities by international governmental and non-governmental organizations highly difficult.

7. CONCLUSIONS                                                                                                

No government can afford to pay attention only to human rights in its foreign policy. There are always other issues to consider. Only certain non-governmental organizations, like human rights advocacy groups, can afford to be single-minded in the sense that they need not have other concerns to deal with. What it boils down to is that governments are continually faced with the dilemma of making the right choices at the right time. Where and when to work for the promotion and protection of human rights in the world is one of these choices. 

The difficulty of this weighing process has been brought out in this paper. It should be remembered that governments are seldom free to make such choices simply on their merits. They are constrained by their own identity, domestic history, by the history of their bilateral and multilateral relations and, particularly by the fact that they are under constant pressure: pressure by parliament, by the press, by public opinion and, last but not least, by non-governmental organizations. All of these actors watch governmental steps carefully and express their views and criticisms whenever and wherever they find that necessary. As was pointed out before, this may be true of all forms of policy, but perhaps even more so in the field of human rights foreign policy.

Why is that so? For the simple reason that while the greater part of foreign policy consists of maintaining friendly relations with other governments, human rights happen to be a highly sensitive matter. No government likes being criticized for its human rights policies. What other governments may consider human rights violations, the government in question will see as a legitimate pursuit of its national interests. It will vehemently deny that it has been guilty of human rights violations. If it happens to be a major power -- and sometimes even if it isn’t --, it may respond by hitting back in other fields of foreign policy, such as national security, economic relations, or development cooperation.  That is why a government that has decided to pursue a human rights foreign policy, has to weigh carefully the possible repercussions of such a policy.

That means also that choices have to be made among the states whose human rights violations one wants to criticize. It is manifestly impossible for a foreign ministry to deal with all human rights violations of all states at the same time. Again this means a careful consideration of where one wants to pinpoint one’s arrows. Only to one’s (potential) foes? Or indeed to one’s allies? To major powers or rather not? Only to so-called gross violations rather than more minor ones? Whatever the choice will be, there are bound to be critics who will bring out the necessary inconsistencies in those choices. 

An important criterion in the selection of policy instruments is their expected effectiveness. Small and medium-sized states may find it useful to tune their policy to that of the “like-minded.” The voice of two, three or fifteen and perhaps twenty-seven (the EU!) states will be more influential than the voice of one state. However, this may raise the difficulty of reaching agreement among sovereign units and the chance that the original point of view may become diluted. Difficult choices have to be made between effectiveness, credibility and the necessity of looking for compromi​ses. Such choices are also influenced by expected reprisals on the part of the affected government.

Finally, there is the matter of credibility to its own domestic public. Foreign policy is not made in vacuo. Foreign policy makers must take account of domestic public opinion. That public opinion is expressed in parliament, in the press, through political parties and by non-governmental organizations. Violations of human rights in other parts of the world are reported in the media and may elicit indignant reactions. This is another aspect which governments have to consider in their choice of policy instruments.

At least in words, if not in actions, there seems to be an international consensus in favour of human rights. Such consensus has positive as well as less positive aspects. One of the positive aspects is that governments can be confronted with their own words – especially if actual practice is not fully in accordance with the theory. Such confrontations take place on a daily basis: in the UN Human Rights Council, the Security Council, the General Assembly; in the framework of the OSCE, the Council of Europe, NATO, the Organization of American States, the African Union, and elsewhere. Sometimes, this has effect and may lead to an improvement of the human rights situation. But consensus has also negative aspects. It can mean that one may close one’s eyes to problems that are the consequences of greater respect for human rights; or to political dilemmas for which there are no simple solutions. 

Whoever decides to make human rights a constituent element of foreign policy will be confronted with such dilemmas. There are no simple recipes for solving them. Having weighed pros and cons, a decision must somehow be made. That is part and parcel of policy-making in general, including the making of foreign policy.
                                                                                                 
International and national non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play a role of great importance in the field of human rights. A number of treaties in that field and supervisory procedures would not have come about, were it not for the activities of these NGOs. They are single-minded in their pursuit of the promotion and protection of human rights and continuously remind governments of the obligations these have voluntarily taken upon themselves.

Multinational corporations increasingly play a role in the field of human rights. Times are past in which multinationals limited themselves to the assertion that they were ‘obeying the law of the land’ where they had important foreign investments and that human rights were a matter of politics to be left to the states. More and more, one may find that such major companies take pride in the attention they pay to human rights considerations, making them even an aspect of their public relations activities. 

Finally, there are other non-state actors which may aspire to statehood or whose activities have important repercussions for states and for human rights. This is a wide-ranging category of armed opposition groups that include the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), various Kurdish groups, but also guerrilla groups such as operating in Algeria, Colombia, Mexico, Congo, Angola, Northern Ireland and elsewhere, including the Al Qu’aida network. They may refer to themselves as ‘liberation movements’ or ‘freedom fighters,’ whereas their opponents may rather see them as ‘rebels’ or even ‘terrorists.’      

In the Final Declaration of the second World Conference on Human Rights in 1993, it was stated all human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated: “While the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.”​[19]​ That statement deserves to be constantly recalled and to be remembered by all actors in foreign policy.
                                                                  







PAGE  



1



^1	  The greater part of this paper is based on notions developed in a book by the author and MONIQUE C. CASTERMANS-HOLLEMAN, The Role of Human Rights and Foreign Policy, ( Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan), 3rd ed., 2004.
^2	  MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS, Human Rights and Foreign Policy. Memorandum presented to the Lower House of the States General of the Kingdom of the Netherlands on 3 May 1979 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Development Cooperation. (The Hague, 1979), official English version, p. 71.
^3	  Speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Mr. Bernard Bot, 21 September 2006.
^4	  See MONIQUE C. CASTERMANS-HOLLEMAN, ‘State Sovereignty and the International Protection of Human Rights,’ in: MOOREHEAD WRIGHT (ed.), Morality and International Relations: Concepts and Issues, (Aldershot: Avebury, 1996), pp. 119-120.
^5	  See: HENRY KISSINGER, Diplomacy, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994). 
^6	  See further BAEHR EN CASTERMANS-HOLLEMAN, op. cit.. pp. 107-108.
^7	  See further: MARLIES GLASIUS,  ‘Human Rights Conditionality Between the Netherlands and Indonesia: Two Cases Compared,’” in: MIELLE BULTERMAN, AART HENDRIKS EN JACQUELINE SMITH (eds.), To Baehr in Our Minds: Essays on Human Rights from the Heart of the Netherlands, SIM Special No. 21 (Utrecht: SIM, 1998), pp. 249-269; PETER R. BAEHR, ‘On an Equal Footing? The Netherlands and Indonesia,’ in: PETER BAEHR,  MONIQUE CASTERMANS-HOLLEMAN EN FRED GRÜNFELD, Human Rights in the Foreign Policy of the Netherlands, (Antwerpen/Oxford/New York: Intersentia), pp. 173-194.
^8	  See further: DAVID FORSYTHE (ed.), The United States and Human Rights: Looking Inward and Outward,  (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2000); JULIE MERTUS, Bait and Switch? Human Rights and American Foreign Policy, (New York: Routledge, 2004).
^9	  See further: CLAUDE E. WELCH JR. (ed.), NGOs and Human Rights: Promise and Performance, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001); PETER WILLETTS, ‘What Is A Non-Governmental Organization?’ http://www.staf.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/CS-NTWKS/NGO-ART.HTM (accessed on 2 February 2007).
^10	  GONGOs=Government Organized Non-Governmental Organizations; QUANGOs=Quasi Non-Governmental Organizations; DONGOs=Donor Organized Non-Governmental Organizations.
^11	  See: JEM BENDELL, Debating NGO Accountability, (Geneva and New York: United Nations, 2006).
^12	  For a useful survey of various kinds of government responses see STANLEY COHEN, States of Denial: Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering, (Cambridge: Polity, 2001). 
^13	  NICOLA JÄGERS. ‘Transnational Corporations and Human Rights,’ in: MIELLE BULTERMAN, AART HENDRIKS EN JACQUELINE SMITH (eds.), To Baehr in Our Minds: Essays in Human Rights from the Heart of the Netherlands, (Utrecht: SIM Special No. 21, 1998), pp.79-83. See also her Corporate Human Rights Obligations: In Search of Accountability, (Antwerpen/Oxford/New York: Intersentia, 2002).
^14	  Multinational Enterprises and Human Rights, (Utrecht, 1998).
^15	 MORTON E. WINSTON, ‘Assessing the Effectiveness of International Human Rights NGOs: Amnesty International,’ in: CLAUDE E. WELCH JR. (ed.), NGOs and Human Rights: Promise and Performance, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), p. 44.
^16	  AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ‘Solidarity Action for Universal Rights: Making Multinational Companies Accountable – Protecting Human Rights in a “Globalised” Economy’, AI Index: ACT 70/01/99, p. 26 February 1999, 1. See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, World Report 2001, p. 3: “Some of the most alarming by-products of globalization are clear violations of rights emphasized in international treaties. “ 
^17	 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, World Report 2001, p. 5.
^18	  LIESBETH ZEGVELD, Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 171 and 216.
^19	  United Nations General Assembly, A/CONF.157/23, 12 July 1993, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, par. 5; italics supplied.
